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THE WARREN COURT AND DESEGREGATION 
Robert L. Carter* 
I. 
W HEN Chief Justice ·warren assumed his post in October 1953, the underpinnings of the "separate but equal"1 concept had 
become unmoored beyond restoration. Full-scale argument on the 
validity of apartheid in public education was only weeks away, and 
the portent of change in the constitutional doctrine governing 
American race relations was unmistakable. Although the ground-
work had been carefully prepared2 for the Chief Justice's announce-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education3 that fundamental principles 
forbade racial segregation in the nation's public schools, the decision, 
when it was delivered on :May 17, 1954, was more than a break with 
the past. In interpreting the fourteenth amendment as guaranteeing 
and securing to Negroes equality in substance rather than in mere 
form, the Brown decision was a revolutionary statement of race 
relations law. 
Brown was the culmination of a trend, evident as early as 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,4 away from the arid and so-
phistical reading of the Civil War amendments marked by the 
legalisms of Plessy v. Ferguson.5 Instead, the Supreme Court in 
the first half of this century had begun to address itself to the task 
of formulating a pragmatic and realistic interpr..etation of what 
those amendments demanded in respect to the Negro's civil and 
political status. "Sophisticated as well as simpleminded" modes of 
racial discrimination were understood to be within the Constitu-
tion's reach.0 The fom:t.eenth. amendment's guaranty of equal educa-
tional opportunity ·was said to be open-ended; it insured material 
equality;7 it encompassed intangibles not subject to objective mea-
surement;8 and it forbade restrictions impairing and inhibiting a 
• Member of the Xew York Bar. Former General Counsel, National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People. A.B. 1937, Lincoln University; LL.B. 1940, 
Howard University; LL.:\I. 1941, Columbia University.-Ed. 
I. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 l".S. 537 (1896). 
2. P. FREUND, THE Sl'PRDIE COT:RT OF THE UNITED STATES 172-73 (1961). Actually, 
:\fcLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), had forecast what the 
Court would decide in Brou•n. 
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). 
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 u.S. 537 (1896). 
8. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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black student's ability to study and exchange views with other 
students.9 
With the decision in Brown, enforced racial segregation in edu-
cation was put beyond the pale. More than that, the approach to 
which the Warren Court was fully committed required an examina-
tion and evaluation of any act, practice, or device which was under-
taken with government sponsorship, in order to determine whether 
in purpose or effect black students were thereby denied their consti-
tutional right to truly equal educational opportunity. Similarly, a 
like test seemed to be applicable in all other areas of governmental 
activity. Brown thus extended to its natural consequences could 
mean that the fetters binding the Negro were at last being struck, 
and that he would henceforth be able to stretch himself to his full 
potential. 
Decision in the school desegregation cases began the Warren 
Court's long involvement in the development of race relations law. 
Subsequent opinions soon underscored the universality, permanence, 
and enduring nature of the newly announced constitutional doctrine. 
Segregation was struck down in public parks, 10 in intrastate11 and 
interstate12 commerce, at public golf courses13 and other recreational 
facilities,1-1 in airports15 and interstate bus terminals,16 in libraries,17 
and in the facilities of public buildings18 and courtrooms.19 Unlaw-
ful discrimination was found in the listing of candidates for public 
office by race on the ballot;20 in the Southern custom of addressing 
black witnesses by their first name;21 and in making marriage22 and 
~xual relations23 between blacks and whites a crime. 
In its refusal to tolerate open attempts to evade24 or frustrate21i 
9. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
10. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); New Orleans City Park lmprovement 
Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (memorandum decision). 
ll. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (memorandum decision). 
12. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (application of Interstate Commerce 
Act). 
13. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (memorandum decision). 
14. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Mayor 8: City Council of Baltimore 
City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (memorandum decision). 
15. Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 762 (1962). 
16. Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965); Bo}nton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 903 
(1956) (memorandum decision). 
17. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Autholity, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
19. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). 
20. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
21. Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964). 
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
23. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958). 
25. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), 
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compliance with Brown, the Warren Court made clear that the new 
doctrine was a fixed and permanent aspect of its approach to con-
stitutional adjudication in the race relations field. In addition, a 
broadened definition of state action, encompassing all situations in 
which the state was significantly involved in supporting or en-
couraging discrimination, extended the reach of the fourteenth 
amendment.26 The Court ruled that a state is under no affirmative 
obligation to enact antidiscrimination legislation, and that when 
such laws are promulgated, they may be repealed; but the Court 
added the precautionary caveat that if in the process of repeal the 
state tips the political balance in favor of racial discrimination, it 
violates the fourteenth amendment.27 
The Court also sought to strengthen and further the desegrega-
tion process by protecting and undergirding the peaceful self-help 
activities of those individuals and·groups seeking to eliminate segre-
gation. The rationale for extending the constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of association and expression to membership in civil rights 
groups and their sponsorship of test litigation reveals the Warren 
Court at its best in adapting the Constitution's safeguards to real-
life situations. Until the Civil Rights Act of 196428 empowered the 
federal government to use its resources in furthering desegregation, 
the only method available to secure compliance with Brown in the 
face of resistance was affirmative action by individuals or groups. 
The Supreme Court was sensitive to this problem, and when 
Alabama sought to still concerted group agitation and activity for 
desegregation by requiring public identification of all NAACP 
members in the state, the Court realized that such enforced dis-
closure would expose the members to coercion, intimidation, re-
prisals, and harassment,.. Recognizing that this would impair, if not 
destroy, concerted civil rights activity, the Court concluded that the 
constitutional guaranty of freedom of association embraced and in-
cluded privacy in one's associational relationships, absent a counter-
vailing state interest of compelling dimensions.29 Subsequently, in 
26. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
27. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). A variation on the Reitman formula 
involving a referendum repealing an open housing ordinance and barring all such 
future legislation except on referendum of the electorate is now pending before the 
Supreme Court. Hunter v. Erickson, #63, Oct. Term 1968. 
28. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000 (1964). 
29. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 
(1961); accord, Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). Shelton v. -Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479 (1960), dealt with a more difficult aspect of the question than forced disclosure 
of membership. An Arkansas statute, broadly requiring public school teachers to list 
all organizational connections over a stated period of time as a prerequisite to em• 
plo)ment, was held to be too unselective and sweeping. In Gibson v. Florida Legis-
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striking down state efforts to make group sponsorship of civil rights 
litigation unlawful, the Court correctly classified such court action 
as a protected form of political expression for the black community80 
-and indeed for many years it was the only effective method of 
political expression available. 
On the other hand, the Court's concern for keeping peaceful 
protest ·activity alive and its pragmatic approach to decision-making 
led to a rather bizarre development in the sit-in cases. While the 
Court was determined to support the efforts of college students to 
break the pattern of racial segregation in the South by organized 
sit-in activities, it was not prepared to extend Shelly v. Kraemer31 
in order to prohibit state enforcement of private discrimination in 
places of public accommodation, or to break new ground by adopt-
ing some other approach to decision that would bar state use of its 
breach of the peace or trespass la·ws to defeat this kind of civil rights 
effort.32 Instead, it held to an ad hoc method of adjudication, render-
ing decisions good for one case and one case only.33 The Court came 
lative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), Florida sought disclosure of the 
names of all members of the NAACP in Miami to determine the extent of the orga-
nization's infiltration by Communists. The Court held that enforced disclosure could 
be allowed only after a showing of a nexus between the organization about which 
the membership inquiry was being made and subversion. For a more detailed discus• 
sion of this development, see Carter, Association: Civil Liberties and the Civil Rights 
Movement, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 181 (1965). In addition 
to aiding this form of self-help, the Court granted certiorari in NAACP v. Webb's 
City, 375 U.S. 939 (1963), to review the validity of a state injunction barring peaceful 
consumer picketing sponsored by a civil rights group to pressure store owners to 
abandon their policy of segregation. The question was not decided, however, because 
on respondent's suggestion of moot.ness, the judgment was vacated and remanded to 
effectuate respondent's representation that the injunction would be set aside. 376 U.S. 
1-SO (1964). 
30. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
31. 334 U.S. l (1948). 
32. In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), the six members of the Court who 
were prepared to decide on a constitutional basis the validity of state trespass con-
victions of sit-in demonstrators for refusing to leave a restaurant on orders from 
the owner were evenly divided. The three other members of the Court were not 
prepared to face the issue, and thus the case was remanded to state coun for recon-
sideration in light of the newly enacted law barring discrimination in places of public 
accommodations. 
33. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (no evidentiary basis for 
conviction for breach of peace, and conviction for criminal trespass could not be 
sustained since not charged); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (196!1) (city 
ordinance held to require restaurant discrimination, hence exclusion of Negroes was 
unconstitutional state action requiring setting aside conviction for criminal trespass); 
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (statements of mayor and chief of police 
construed as mandating continuation of the racial exclusion by restaurant owners and 
unconstitutional state action thus involved); Robinson v. Florida, !178 U.S. 15!1 (1964) 
(invalid state action embodying a state policy discouraging restaurant owners from 
serving the two groups without discrimination found in state regulations i&Sued by 
the state board of health requiring restaurant owners with both white and black 
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out on the right side in supporting and sustammg this form of 
peaceful protest, but its reasoning was strained and tortured. Its 
decisions kept the sit-in movement viable until enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which reduced racial discrimination in 
places of public accommodation to an issue of minor significance.34 
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has undoubt-
edly concerned itself more with the affirmative development of sub-
stantive constitutional doctrine upholding equal rights than at any 
other time during its history. It has been criticized for its decisions 
and for its activism, but the criticism is misplaced. The Court in 
Brown, in requiring the elimination of enforced racial segregation 
as an essential prerequisite to equal education, did no more than 
the Plessy v. Ferguson Court had done in devising the separate-but-
equal standard as an appropriate constitutional yardstick. Both 
Courts attempted to give what tl,e~· saw a:, effective and meaningful 
import to the fourteenth amendmem\: g-,~aranty of equal protection 
and, in so doing, both made national policy in the race relations 
field. Plessy paid homage to the equal rights verbiage of the four-
teenth amendment while in fact legitimizing governmental subor-
dination of blacks to whites. The rhetoric of Brown, on the other 
hand, sought to make the same grant of equality an ingredient 
of real life in the Negro community. 
The problem is that while the Warren Court's rhetoric is broad 
and sweeping, its decisions have kept to a rather narrow path. It has 
in the main addressed itself solely to the task of outlawing formal-
ized public discrimination-to the appearance rather than the sub-
stance of racism. The Court has not expanded or extended Brown. 
It has not dealt with the question of de facto school segregation-an 
issue which is as potentj~lly explosive today as was formal _segrega-
tion in 1954.35 Therefore, we do not know what equal education 
employees to provide separate lavatories for each race and each sex); Griffin v. ~ary• 
land, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (special policeman employed by park was a deputy sheriff 
and arrested demonstrators in his role as state official, unlawful state action thus 
found). For full discussion of sit•in cases, see Paulson, The Sit-In Cases of 1961: "But 
Answer Came There None," 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 137. 
34. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Katzenbach 
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), upheld the constitutionality of Title II of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000:\ (1964) (barring discrimination in public accommodations). 
In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), the Court construed the federal 
civil rights law barring discrimination in places of public accommodation as requiring 
the abatement of all criminal prosecution under state law, both prior and subsequent 
to tlle passage of the Act, growing out of efforts to secure unsegregated access to public 
accommodation facilities. 
35. See Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) (holding that de facto school 
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means in the context of Northern-style school segregation.86 Although 
the Court supported and protected the sit-in movement, it developed 
no cutting principles of law which would bar states from lending 
their weight, under the guise of enforcing criminal trespass laws, to 
the support of private discrimination practiced by restaurant or 
hotel owners.31 
White supremacy, with or without formalized public discrimi-
nation, is the pervasive evil-the unyielding and persistent deterrent 
to fulfillment of the aims of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth 
amendments. However, while the Warren Court did not go as far 
as it could have in the development of the substantive constitutional 
doctrine which Brown augured, what it did accomplish is of great 
significance. The broad rhetoric is there to build upon in the future. 
As stated earlier, the Court has attempted to deal forthrightly with 
one aspect of the race r~lations -question-formalized public discrim-
ination. And here, except for the troublesome problem of school 
segregation, it has done quite well. Moreover, the Court's persever-
ance has helped considerably in revealing the true dimensions of 
the race problem which confronts the nation today. What is now 
crystal clear is that solution of this problem will involve state and 
segregation raised no constitutional question); Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 
(W.D. Okla. 1965), afj'd, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967), 
(avoidance of de facto segregation constitutionally required). Balaban v. Rubin, 40 
:'.\Iisc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963), afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 
250 N.Y.5.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964) (local school board's deliberate effort 
to eliminate racial imbalance constitutionally permissible). See also Booker v. Board 
of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965). An interesting phenomenon is Downs v. 
Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965), and 
Dowell v. School Bd., supra. These two cases involved similar situations and like 
principles. In both cases transition from pre-Brown segregation to a unitary school 
system which Brown required was said to be completed. In Downs, when the transition 
resulted in a de facto situation which confined the black children to virtually the 
~ame educational isolation that had existed before, the courts held that no consti-
tutional question was involved. In Dowell the trial court ruled that the transition 
necessitated an avoidance of a substitution of de facto school segregation for pre-
Brown school segregation. The Supreme Court refused to review either holding, 
clearly demonstrating that it is not yet prepared to face the question. See generally 
Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutio11al 
Questions Presented, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 502 (1965); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the 
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965); Peck &: 
Cohen, The Social Context of School Segregation, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 475 (1965); 
Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto School Segregation, 
40 ~.Y.U. L. REv. 285 (1965). 
36. For a most comprehensive analysis of that question, see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). See also Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational oppor-
tunity for Negroes of the North and West: The Emerging Role for Private Consti-
tutional Litigation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 698 (1967). 
37. The difficulty the ad hoc decision poses can be seen in comparing Edward~ v. 
South Carolina, .3i2 U.S. 229 (1963), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), 
where, on virtually the same set of facts, the Court reached opposite results. 
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federal efforts of the greatest magnitude. The elimination of formal-
ized public discrimination will not suffice. 
Lately, the Court has seemed to show signs of_ wanting the exec-
utive and legislative branches of government to take over responsi-
bility for fulfilling the commitment which the nation made to the 
black community in the Civil War amendments. It has made clear 
that Congress, in implementing the objectives of the fourteenth 
amendment, has power to prohibit private discrimination as well 
as that supported by the state.38 Last term, instead of waiting for 
the open housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 196839 to take 
effect on January 1, 1969,40 the Court resurrected the Civil Rights 
Act of 186641 as a viable federal law applicable to discrimination in 
the public and private sale or rental of housing.42 The Court noted 
that racial discrimination which "herds men into ghettos and makes 
their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin ... 1s 
a relic of slavery.''43 
II. 
After declaring in Brown I that segregated education denied the 
constitutional guaranty of equal protection, a year later in Brown II 
the ·warren Court addressed itself to the question of what remedy 
should be granted.44 The formula adopted by the Court-requiring 
a "good faith" start in the transformation from a dual to a unitary 
school system, with compliance being accomplished with "all delib-
erate speed"-was a grave mistake. It has kept the Court mired in 
the vexing problems of progress in school desegregation for the past 
thirteen years. Although the Court denied that this formula was 
intended to do more than allow time for necessary administrative 
changes which transformation to a desegregated school system re-
quired, it is clear that· -ivhat the formula required was movement 
toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept. 
Until Brown II, constitutional rights had been defined as personal 
and present. In the exercise of that ephemeral quality called judicial 
statesmanship, the ·warren Court sacrificed individual and imme-
diate vindication of the newly discovered right to desegregated edu-
cation in favor of a mass solution. This was frequently reflected by 
the Court's tendency to avoid individual solutions in favor of ap-
38. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
39. 82 Stat. 73, tit. VIII. 
40. Tit. VIII, § 803(a)(2). 
41. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981-82 (1964). 
42. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
43. 392 U.S. at 442-43. 
44. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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proving long-range desegregation plans that would presumably 
benefit large groups of students in the future.4G 
The Court undoubtedly failed to realize the depth or nature of 
the problem. It undertook to oversee the pace of desegregation and 
apparently believed that its show of compassion and understanding 
of the problem facing the white South would help develop a willing-
ness to comply. Instead, the "all deliberate speed" formula aroused 
the hope that resistance to the constitutional imperative would suc-
ceed. As indicated above, the Court did condemn open resistance 
with firm resolve; but since its concern was to secure "an initial 
break in the long established pattern of excluding Negro children 
from schools attended by white children, the principal focus was in 
obtaining for these Negro children courageous enough to break with 
tradition a place in the white school."46 
In its anxiety to get the desegregation process moving at all costs, 
the Court condoned the application of procedural requirements and 
pupil placement laws which it knew were designed to delay or evade 
substantial compliance with the principles enunciated in Brown I. 
For eight years after its implementation decision, the Court refused 
to review any case in which questions were raised concerning the 
validity of pupil placement regulations or the appropriateness of 
applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to 
frustrate suits seeking to vindicate the right to a desegregated edu-
cation.47 Plans which called for the desegregation of only one grade 
per year were left standing.48 
45. In Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413 (1956), the Court 
made clear that its "all deliberate .speed" formula was applicable only to grade and 
secondary school desegregation. The personal and present nature of the right to equal 
education remained unimpaired at all other educational levels and thus required 
immediate vindication .. More recently, in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), 
involving segregation in a public park, it made the same point. 
46. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). 
47. Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 
(1959) (pupil placement law validated and pTOcedures established required to be fol-
lowed); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 
(1956) (exhaustion of administrative remedies); Hood v. Board of Trustees, 232 F.2d 
626 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956) (exhaustion of administrative 
remedies required); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. 
Ala. 1958), afj'd (on the limited ground on which the district court rested its decision), 
358 U.S. 101 (1958); accord, Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959) (requirement that parent and child follow procedures 
established by pupil placement board sustained); DeFebio v. County Bd., 199 Va. 511, 
100 S.E.2d 760 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 218 (1958). 
48. Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
924 (1959); Slade v. Board of Educ., 252 F.2d 29r (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 
U.S. 906 (1958) (a plan of desegregation spread over a shorter space of time). But su 
Ennis v. Evans, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.-1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961) (state plan 
calling for desegregation grade-by-grade over twelve-year span, disapproved and total 
integration ordered by fall 1961); Evans v. Buchanan, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958), 
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As time passed and no appreciable progress was made, the 
Warren Court began to manifest impatience. In 1962, it announced 
in Bailey v. Patterson49 that no substantial question was involved as 
to the invalidity of state laws requiring segregation; the issue, the 
Court stated, had been resolved. The following year the Court ruled 
that the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies 
before relief could be sought in federal court had no application to 
questions of school desegregation.60 In Griffin v. Prince Edward 
County Board of Education, which was decided in 1964, the Court 
stated that the time for mere deliberate speed had run out.51 And 
a year later, in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,52 it stated that 
"[ d]elays in desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable.''53 
In spite of these belated efforts, the Warren Court's formula has 
actually accomplished very little school desegregation. By the 1963-
1964 school year, for example, the eleven states of the old Confed-
eracy had a mere 1.17 per cent of their black students attending 
schools with white students. In 1964-1965, the percentage had risen 
to 2.25 per cent because of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.5• For the 1965-1966 school year-as a result of guidelines de-
vised by the United States Department of Health, Education, and 
·welfare-the percentage reached 6.01 per cent.55 Fear of losing fed-
eral funds had become a motivating factor inducing school authori-
ties to efiectuate some small measure of desegregation.56 
The reason for the specific failure of the Court's formula is rea-
sonably clear. The ·warren Court had placed the primary responsi-
bility for making the transition from the oid standard to the new 
one upon local public school officials. These people were most prone 
to resent and resist the changes ordered by the Court, and to look 
upon the newly enunciated constitutional doctrine as a personal 
repudiation. l\foreover, the lower federal courts were given the elu-
sive standard of "good faith" by which to measure compliance. This 
led the courts to require a showing of subjective evil intent on the 
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 {1958) (state superintendent and state board of education 
under orders to formulate a .plan of desegregation for entire state). 
49. 369 U.S. 31 (1962). 
50. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
51. 3i7 U.S. 216, 234. 
52. 382 U.S. 103 (1965). 
53. 382 U.S. at 105. 
54. See United States v. JclT<•t-,;on County Bd. of Educ .. 372 F.2d 836, 903 (5th Cir. 
1966); SOUTHERN Enuc. REP. St'R\. STATISI1CAL SUMMARY (15th ed. 1965). See also 
Kurland, Equal Ed11catio11al Opf1t>rtu11ity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 58!1, 594 (1968). 
55. For discussion of effectiveness of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare guidelines in increasing the pace of desegregation, see Dunn, Title VI, The 
Guid~lines in School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967). 
56. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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part of local officials as a prerequisite to granting relief from need-
less delay. 
At present, stricter standards for compliance are in effect. In the 
1965 decisions of Bradley51 and Rogers v. Paul,58 the Court appar-
ently concluded that a new yardstick had to be devised to assess 
compliance efforts. This new approach is to evaluate the desegrega-
tion on the basis of its effectiveness--to determine whether the plans 
gave "meaningful assurance of a prolll.pt and effective disestablish-
ment"59 of the biracial school system. Effective results in eliminating 
segregation root and branch are now required, and desegregation 
plans must hold out a realistic promise of success. 
With the decision in Brown I the Court embarked upon a course 
designed in the short run to transform the Southern biracial school 
system into a unitary school system. in the long run, Brown I sig-
nalled the end of all public impediments, whatever their source, 
which denied black children their right to equal education. In de-
ciding to oversee the pace of desegregation, which was what Brown 
II entailed, the Warren Court took upon itself an unnecessary re-
sponsibility for the South's failure to respond. It would have fared 
better in not departing from the usual standard-in ordering the 
immediate vindication of the rights that it had declared to exist in 
Brown I. Such a course probably would not have resulted in de-
segregation at a faster pace, but it would have kept the Court's image 
from being tarnished by first yielding fruitlessly to expediency. 
III. 
Brown v. Board of Education fathered a social upheaval the 
extent and consequences of which cannot even now be measured 
with certainty. It marks a divide in American life. The holding that 
the segregation of blacks in the nation's public schools is a denial 
of the Constitution's command implies that all racial segregation 
in American public life is invalid-that all racial discrimination 
sponsored, supported, or encouraged by government is unconstitu-
tional. As a result of this seminal decision, blacks had the right to 
use· the main, not the separate, waiting room; to choose any seat in 
the bus; to relax in the public parks on the same terms as any other 
member of the community. This and more became their birthright 
under the Constitution. 
Equal rights legislation could no longer be regarded as a gift 
57. 382 U.S. 103. 
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benignly bestowed by an enlightened and liberal-minded electorate. 
Antidiscrimination laws were no longer great milestones; rather, 
they served merely as administrative machinery. useful for accom-
plishing what the fundamental law required. While such machinery 
was, of course, vital and important, these statutes could now be 
critically assessed not in respect to the "good intentions" which led 
to their enactment, but rather in terms of the results achieved in 
alleYiating the particular forms of discrimination they were sup-
posed to regulate. 
Thus, the psychological dimensions of America's race relations 
problem were completely recast. Blacks were no longer supplicants 
seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged members of 
the human race; no longer were they appealing to morality, to con-
science, to white America's better instincts. They were entitled to 
equal treatment as a right under the law; when such treatment was 
denied, they were being deprived-in fact robbed--of what was 
legally theirs. As a result, the Negro was propelled into a stance of 
insistent militancy. Now he was demanding-fighting to secure and 
possess what was rightfully his. The appeal to morality and to con-
science still was valid, of course, but in a nation that was wont to 
describe itself as a society ruled by law, blacks had now perhaps the 
country's most formidable claim to fulfillment of their age-old dream 
of equal status--fulfillment of their desire to become full and equal 
participants in the mainstream of American life. 
Brown's indirect consequences, therefore, have been awesome. It 
has completely altered the style, the spirit, and the stance of race 
relations. Yet the pre-existing pattern of white superiority and black 
subordination remains unchanged; indeed, it is now revealed as a 
national rather than a. -regional phenomenon. Thus, Brown has 
promised more than it could give, and therefore has contributed to 
black alienation and bitterness, to a loss of confidence in white insti-
tutions, and to the growing racial polarization of our society. This 
cannot in any true sense be said to be the responsibility of the 
·warren Court. Few in the country, black or white, understood in 
1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; 
that the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations 
is geared to the maintenance of white superiority. 
Having opened this Pandora's Box, the Court was left for a long 
time to handle the problem alone. It is to its credit that the Warren 
Court did net falter in its resolve_or turn away from its commitment 
to cut away all government support for discrimination. 
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While I have reservations about what the Court has done or 
failed to do, I am forced to recognize that even if the Court had 
functioned as I suggest it should have, we would probably be no 
nearer to the elimination of racism in this country than we are 
today. For, whatever the Court does, our society is composed of a 
series of insulated institutions and interests antithetical to the 
Negro's best interest. Effective regulation and control of these insti-
tutions and interests must come not from the Supreme Court but 
from the bodies politic. 
